
Alan Milburn spent Tuesday explaining why Britain must spend billions to get its young people into work. The most damaging words in his 278-page review were the ones about who made the problem worse.
The former Labour cabinet minister, now the government’s worklessness tsar, conceded that policies introduced since his party took office have contributed to the rise in youth worklessness. Employer national insurance contributions went up from 13.8 to 15 per cent in April 2025, and the point at which employers start paying them fell from £9,100 to £5,000 a year. The Employment Allowance rose to £10,500, which offsets the increase for many smaller employers, but it is not a blanket shield: companies whose only employee above the threshold is a single director cannot claim it, and neither can employers where half or more of the work is public sector. The youth minimum wage also rose faster than the adult rate. For a great many firms taking on staff, hiring an 18 year old became more expensive, at the precise moment the country needed employers to hire more of them.
“You cannot call youth employment a national priority while making young people harder or more expensive to hire,” Milburn said at the launch.
He is right. And the government he is advising is the one that did it.
That is the contradiction at the centre of the review published on Tuesday. It proposes projected annual spending of up to £5.8bn by 2036-37 on youth employment support, training, health provision and employer subsidies. It expects to recover £3.6bn in that year by replacing Personal Independence Payment and the health element of Universal Credit for the under-25s with a lower youth allowance, plus £2.4bn in extra tax receipts from the jobs it hopes to create. The net saving, in the tenth year, is £200m.
The government has endorsed the review’s principles and created the unit to deliver them. It has not published a funding breakdown. The £5.8bn is a projection for 2036-37, not an authorisation; the welfare changes and the £3.6bn of savings they would release, along with the national insurance cut, are all deferred to a white paper expected next year. Between the ambition and the money sits a spending review, a Commons vote and a Treasury that has so far committed nothing.
In the same breath, the review recommends cutting employer national insurance for 21 to 24 year olds, beginning in retail and hospitality. That is a partial reversal of the government’s own flagship employment tax.
Andy Burnham told his cabinet the review was a “watershed moment”. He has made Milburn chair of a new Youth Opportunities Unit reporting directly to him, and promised a “fundamental overhaul” built on “jobs rather than crude cuts”. What he has not explained is why a government that raised the cost of employing young people should now be trusted with billions to bring it back down.
Labour’s fingerprints are on the problem it now promises to solve
Start with what the review itself accepts, because ministers have been notably quieter about it than about the £5.8bn.
The April 2025 changes were not a uniform levy on every job. Firms below the new £5,000 threshold pay nothing, and the Employment Allowance offsets the increase for many small employers. But eligibility for that allowance is narrower than it sounds, excluding single-director companies and employers doing mostly public sector work, and every employer above the threshold pays the higher rate on a much larger slice of payroll. For most businesses with staff, the cost of employing rose. The review’s author says employers told him so directly. Asked on Sky News whether the changes had damaged hiring, Milburn did not retreat into nuance: “there’s no doubt that that has hit business sentiment. Absolutely, no doubt at all. Employers have come to me and said that that has made it harder.”
He was equally direct at the report’s launch. “You cannot call youth employment a national priority while making young people harder or more expensive to hire.”
Those are not the words of an opposition researcher. They are the words of the man the Work and Pensions Secretary commissioned to examine the problem, describing the effect of his own government’s decisions.
The wider pressures are real, and the review does not pretend otherwise. Health-related worklessness among the young has been climbing for a decade. Employers and careers bodies report that artificial intelligence is reshaping entry-level roles and making them harder to secure, with the Careers and Enterprise Company recording a sharp fall in graduate vacancies, though the scale of that effect remains contested. The Work Foundation has found that the number of starter jobs open to first-time entrants has fallen by 49 per cent over ten years. None of that is Labour’s doing.
But the government cannot have it both ways. It cannot treat a million young people outside work and education as a crisis of opportunity, and simultaneously treat its own contribution to the cost of hiring them as an unfortunate detail. Milburn’s own remedy concedes the point: the single most direct reversal in his package is a cut to the tax his government raised.
Tax employment, then pay employers to employ
This is where the review stops being a welfare story and becomes an indictment of economic competence.
The sequence is not complicated. Labour raises the price of taking on a worker. The predictable effect of a higher price is fewer buyers, and the workers most easily left out are the young and unproven. Milburn’s own review records employers telling him that the change made hiring harder, and concedes that it hit business sentiment. The government then commissions a review, which recommends paying employers to hire the very people it made more expensive to hire, and cutting, for a narrowly defined age group and a narrowly defined set of sectors, the tax it put up in the first place.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies has done the arithmetic that ministers have avoided. Its assessment finds that cutting employer national insurance for 21 to 24 year olds across all sectors would, on average, roughly offset the increase in employer costs created by the 2025 national insurance rise for that age group. In other words, the policy’s ceiling is approximately a return to the status quo ante that Labour itself abolished.
The review does not even propose to go that far. It limits the cut to hospitality and retail at first, and makes it conditional on “fiscal conditions”. The IFS’s verdict on that formulation deserves to be read aloud in the Commons: it is “often code for kicking a policy idea into the long grass”.
Pat McFadden, the Work and Pensions Secretary, was asked about it in the Commons and would not endorse it. “We know that employment costs matter and we will consider all these things as we move forward,” he said. That is the answer of a minister who has accepted, in public, that employment costs matter, and who has nonetheless declined to say whether he will lower them for the age group his own review identifies as hardest hit. The contradiction is his to resolve, and he has left it standing.
There is a second, harder question about whether the money buys anything at all. The review proposes grants of £3,000 for hiring someone who has been outside work for six months, plus £2,000 for those facing greater barriers, alongside subsidised jobs and a much larger apprenticeship programme. The IFS warns that “not all these jobs will be additional, and previous subsidised employment schemes have fallen well short of their target number of placements.”
Ministers are therefore proposing to spend public money on subsidising vacancies that might have been filled anyway, in a labour market where vacancies are disappearing.
What the money actually is, and what it is not
The figures have been repeated so often this week that their meaning has started to blur. They need separating.
The £5.8bn is projected annual gross spending in a single year, 2036-37, covering the guarantee, employer incentives, health support, college places and apprenticeships. It is not the cost of the programme today, and it is not a cumulative ten-year total.
The £3.6bn is a projected annual reduction in benefit spending in that same year, achieved by replacing Personal Independence Payment and the health element of Universal Credit for the under-25s with a single youth allowance.
The £2.4bn is projected additional tax revenue in that same year, contingent on the employment effects materialising.
The £200m is the projected annual net saving in that same year, once the first three are netted off. The review states that the government will not see overall savings from the package until 2036-37. Individual elements save money earlier, and benefit savings from a younger cohort could begin by the end of the decade if legislation passes quickly, but the package as a whole does not pay for itself until the final year of the forecast.
On the review’s own arithmetic, £5.8bn of projected gross annual spending in 2036-37 is offset by £6bn of projected annual savings and receipts in the same year: £3.6bn of benefit savings plus £2.4bn of tax receipts, leaving £200m. Expressed as a ratio, that is roughly £29 of gross annual commitment for every £1 of net annual saving in that single year. The comparison is arithmetically sound but it is a presentational device, not a rate of return: it ignores every pound spent before 2036-37, and it counts gross spending against net saving rather than comparing like with like. What it does illustrate reliably is the shape of the wager, which is a decade of front-loaded expenditure producing a net gain in year ten that amounts to a rounding error against the £431bn the state is forecast to spend on welfare by 2031-32.
What happens if the employment targets are missed has not been modelled in public. The review’s own projections anticipate 440,000 more young people in work by 2036. If the true figure is lower, the £2.4bn of tax receipts falls away first, the £3.6bn of benefit savings is harder to bank because the caseload does not shrink, and the gross cost does not move. The IFS states the risk plainly: “If the reforms are less effective at moving people into work than expected, the package could end up costing the government more, even in the long run.”
That is not an argument against reform. It is an argument for knowing the downside before signing the cheque, and no one in government has yet published one.
Even the review’s own numbers miss the target
The headline ambition is to cut the share of 16 to 24 year olds not in education, employment or training from 13 per cent to 5 per cent within a decade, a rate Britain has never recorded.
The modelling does not get there. The IFS notes that the review’s own figures imply a NEET rate of around 7 per cent by 2036, not 5 per cent, alongside the 440,000 additional young people in work. The 5 per cent figure is an aspiration attached to a package that, on its author’s own sums, delivers something short of it.
There are two further obstacles, both documented. Scaling up provision quickly is difficult: the IFS points out that the previous Conservative government fell well short of its apprenticeship targets between 2015 and 2020, and that many employment support schemes have struggled to deliver the planned number of places. And the evidence base for programmes of this kind is thin, which is the subject the Office for Budget Responsibility addressed in unusually blunt terms last month.
The OBR has already written the warning
In its October economic and fiscal outlook, the OBR examined two employment programmes announced by the previous government with considerable confidence. The extension of NHS Talking Therapies was forecast in November 2023 to raise employment by 10,000 people. It “has not been delivered”. Connect to Work was assumed to raise employment by around 25,000; the number of participants supported is now expected to be “around a third lower than we assumed by 2028-29”.
Paragraph 3.35 explains why that matters to any minister banking savings from a programme that does not yet exist. Such estimates, the OBR writes, “illustrate the challenges of making explicit adjustments to the economy forecast for departmental spending policies, given that the impacts are highly sensitive to subsequent changes to policy and operational design, possible reprioritisation of funding, delivery challenges, and wider changes to spending programmes which may have offsetting effects.”
Those programmes were not Labour’s. That is precisely the point. The failure mode is not partisan. It is what happens when a well-announced scheme meets a funding decision, an operational redesign and a change of minister.
The question for this government is therefore direct. What is different? Where is the delivery plan that survives a spending review? Where is the independent costing? And why should the public accept a ten-year projection from a department whose predecessors have twice been marked down by the fiscal watchdog within three years of announcing a scheme?
No OBR costing has been published alongside the review. Ministers have not said whether they will seek one. On the evidence of the past decade, that omission should be treated as the story rather than the footnote.
The young people who would pay for it
The £3.6bn does not appear from nowhere. It comes from 390,000 people aged 18 to 24 in England and Wales who currently receive a health-related benefit, collecting an average of £9,500 a year, according to IFS analysis.
The review proposes ending PIP and the health element of Universal Credit for that age group and replacing them with a youth allowance, set at the basic rate of Universal Credit, with a higher rate for those living independently. Support would be reserved for conditions judged “well established, significant and ongoing”.
That is a fundamental redrawing of the contract with disabled young people, and it is being sold as an investment programme. The two are not the same thing. What the review recommends is not government policy: the welfare changes, the savings and the national insurance cut are all deferred to a white paper expected early next year, after Sir Stephen Timms reports on PIP. But the spending that depends on those savings is being announced now.
The distributional consequences are severe and should be stated precisely. The review proposes removing PIP and the health element of Universal Credit from this age group, replacing them with a youth allowance set at the basic rate, and reserving additional support for conditions judged “well established, significant and ongoing”. The IFS concludes that “many of those with less severe disabilities would be likely to see large income losses initially”, with only some able to offset the loss by moving into work.
The scale of the redistribution is contested, and the article uses the figure from the primary source. In its published response the IFS states that the £3.6bn is “equivalent to 50% of projected spending on health-related benefits for young people in 2036-37”, which on the think tank’s own measure is half the budget. This is not a marginal adjustment: it is a substantial reduction in the financial support currently available to young disabled people, offset in part by a new allowance and by more help in kind, but a reduction all the same.
Some of the most vulnerable would receive more. The IFS notes that those with the most severe disabilities could see cash support increase. But it also warns of the risk that has undone every previous attempt at this kind of redesign: governments “have tended to underestimate how many people will qualify for the highest level of support in similar benefits”. The caseload has a habit of exceeding the forecast, which is exactly what happened to PIP.
Two questions follow, and neither has an answer. First, where is the distributional impact assessment? The review asks the public to accept up to £5.8bn of projected annual spending on the strength of £3.6bn of projected annual benefit savings, and no published assessment sets out who loses what, by how much, or how many are expected to be protected. Second, what happens to a young person whose condition is serious but not “well established, significant and ongoing” enough to qualify? The review promises a support guarantee. It does not promise that the support will be funded if the savings underperform.
Katie Schmuecker of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation put the practical objection in one sentence: “Financial support is part of what helps young people take up earning or learning. The wider support offer won’t succeed if the young people it is meant to help are also struggling to afford food or the bus to college.” Ministers have not answered her.
The labour market the plan must conquer
The review was published on the same morning as ONS figures that describe the market this programme must operate in.
Vacancies fell to 690,000, the lowest outside the pandemic since 2014. The sharpest quarterly fall was among businesses with one to nine employees, down 22,000 to 73,000, the lowest for that size band since 2012. Those are precisely the firms expected to claim the hiring grants. Payrolled employment fell by 95,000 over the year to October. The IFS puts the ratio of jobseekers to vacancies at 2.4 to one, up from one to one in 2022.
The scale of the delivery problem is set out in the review’s own supporting evidence. The Work Foundation’s finding of a 49 per cent fall in starter jobs over a decade leaves roughly one entry-level vacancy for every three young people who are NEET. As its director Ben Harrison said: “The reality is that NEET young people can’t access jobs that simply don’t exist.”
There is a further design flaw that ministers have glossed over. The Work and Pensions Committee reported in July that 44 per cent of NEET young people claim no benefits at all, which means they are outside the system that the new youth allowance, the new conditionality and much of the new entitlement are built around. A programme that requires people to come through the benefits system to be helped will not reach nearly half of those it is designed for, unless ministers say explicitly how they will be found.
What the government has actually signed up to
Strip out the rhetoric and the commitments made this week are narrower than the review, and considerably narrower than the spending figure.
Ministers have endorsed the review’s “principles”, created the Youth Opportunities Unit, promised locally led youth services from next year, and adopted an “Opportunity and Support Guarantee”. The welfare reform, the £3.6bn of savings and the national insurance cut are deferred. The white paper follows the Timms review. Legislation follows the white paper.
That sequencing carries the political risk. The savings are the part that pays for the spending. They are also the part most likely to meet resistance from Labour MPs, who blocked a £5bn package of disability cuts under Sir Keir Starmer last year and forced a humiliating retreat. Milburn has tried to disarm that revolt by describing his predecessor’s approach as a “fiscal grab”. Early signs suggest several of last year’s rebels are receptive. But nothing has been voted on.
And the money has not been found. McFadden said he was willing to “reprioritise” spending “from my department”. The Department for Work and Pensions does not hold £5.8bn of discretionary budget. The Government has yet to explain how the remaining expenditure would be allocated across departments, including health, education and skills, in a spending review where defence, pay and inflation are already competing for the same pounds. Milburn’s advice to raid other departments’ budgets is not a funding plan. It is an invitation to a fight he will not have to attend.
The Conservatives, for their part, make the argument in the language of the ledger. Helen Whately, the shadow work and pensions secretary, says Labour is repeating the same pay now, save later playbook: “Labour are committing billions in upfront spending against savings that are speculative, years away”, and worth £200m even on the review’s best case. Kemi Badenoch’s verdict was blunter: “We don’t need costly government schemes to fix Labour’s own mistakes. We need to stop making it so expensive and risky to hire young people.”
That is a coherent alternative, and it deserves to be tested rather than dismissed. The question is whether scrapping employment costs alone would reach a million young people who are not currently in the labour market at all.
The record that should temper the optimism
Britain has run this experiment repeatedly, and the trail is documented.
Disability Living Allowance was replaced by PIP from 2013 on the promise of a 20 per cent reduction in spending, with the OBR forecasting 600,000 fewer claimants. The caseload rose rather than fell, as mental health claims increased and assessment and review processes were dismantled during the pandemic. By 2016 the OBR had conceded that its original projections rested on thin evidence, stating that it “would no longer certify costings where detail on policy design and delivery is so sparse”.
Universal Credit was meant to smooth the passage between benefits and work, at a cost of £2.6bn a year in additional net spending. It cost more than planned and delivered less than promised, and Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee later said it was “sceptical” of the DWP’s claim of a £6bn boost to jobs and output.
Neither precedent proves the Milburn package will fail. Both establish where the burden of proof should sit. On that test, the review offers modelling, ambition and a ten-year horizon. It does not offer independent costing, a delivery plan that survives contact with 690,000 vacancies, or any mechanism that would stop the programme if it does not work.
Milburn’s own justification for speed is revealing. “Prime Minister Burnham is a half-term prime minister and so he needs to get on with it,” he said. A ten-year programme whose savings arrive in 2036 is being sold on the argument that the man in office cannot wait for them. That is not a plan for patience. It is a plan for a legacy.
GREAT BRITISH PAC REACTION
Claire Bullivant, CEO, Great British PAC said:
“Labour has achieved something quite extraordinary. It has taxed young people out of jobs, punished the businesses that might employ them, and now expects the British taxpayer to stump up billions to repair the damage it has caused. You couldn’t make it up.
“This is economic incompetence on a staggering scale. First they raise the cost of employment. Then they express astonishment when businesses stop hiring. And now, instead of admitting their mistake and reversing these damaging taxes, they produce a £5.8 billion-a-year spending proposal, built on speculative savings and the prospect of taking money away from some of our most vulnerable young people.
“Britain’s young people do not need another Labour quango, another ten-year fantasy or another expensive exercise in government self-congratulation. They need jobs, opportunity, apprenticeships and businesses confident enough to take a chance on them.
“And let’s be absolutely clear: disabled young people must not become the financial casualties of Labour’s economic failures.
“A serious government would back British businesses, reward work, cut the cost of hiring and give the next generation a genuine stake in our country’s future.
“Labour created part of this problem. Now it wants the country to pay twice for its mistakes. That is not leadership. It is an admission of failure, and the British people deserve far better.”
GREAT BRITISH PAC DEMANDS
- Publish the full financial model behind the review, including the deadweight, displacement and employment-effect assumptions used to produce the £3.6bn benefit saving, the £2.4bn of tax receipts and the 440,000 jobs figure, so that independent analysts can reproduce the £200m net saving.
- Ask the Office for Budget Responsibility to certify the package before any legislation is introduced, and publish its verdict, including any refusal to certify, in full alongside the white paper.
- Publish a distributional impact assessment before the white paper showing how many of the 390,000 young people on health-related benefits lose income, by how much, how many are projected to replace it through work, and what happens to those who cannot.
- Identify the £500m downpayment for 2027-28 line by line, name every departmental budget it is taken from, and publish the corresponding reductions in the departments that give it up.
- State within 30 days whether employer national insurance for 21 to 24 year olds will be cut, at what cost, on what timetable, and in which sectors, or confirm publicly that the measure has been dropped rather than left conditional on undefined future fiscal conditions.
- Write statutory evaluation into the legislation: independent assessment at years three, five and seven, published milestones for NEET rates, college places and apprenticeship completions, and a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament and explain any missed target.
- Set out how the guarantee will reach the 44 per cent of NEET young people who claim no benefits, with published regional take-up data, so that the young people furthest from the labour market are not quietly excluded from the count.
LABOUR CANNOT TAX A PROBLEM AND THEN BILL US FOR SOLVING IT
The case for doing something about a million young people outside work and education is overwhelming, and nothing in this article weakens it. The case for doing it this way, with this money, on these projections, has not been made.
What has been made is a confession. The government’s own commissioned review says its employment taxes made young people harder to hire. Its answer is projected spending of up to £5.8bn a year by 2036-37, met in large part by restructuring disability support for the under-25s into a £3.6bn annual saving, to persuade employers to do what the taxes discouraged, with £200m of net saving arriving in that tenth year and no independent body having checked any of the sums.
That is not a strategy for growth. It is a cycle: raise the cost of employment, lament the consequences, subsidise the reversal, and ask the taxpayer to fund the round trip.
Labour will say the alternative is doing nothing. It is not. The alternative is to stop making young people expensive to hire, to publish the costings before the commitments, to prove the model on a smaller scale before spending billions on it, and to protect disabled young people rather than treating their support as the downpayment on someone else’s legacy.
The Prime Minister has until the white paper to answer four questions. How much will this cost in each year, not just the tenth? Who will pay, department by department? Who loses, and how much? And who will independently verify any of it?
If the answers are good, he should publish them now, because they would make his case. If they are not, the country deserves to know before the money is committed, not in 2036 when the £200m arrives.




